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Between c.1750 – c.1850 the 
world wood shipbuilding industry 
was marked by a series of competi-
tive shifts, from Dutch leadership 
prior to 1800 (Unger, 1978) to Brit-
ish, French and American struggles 
for dominance through to the 1850s 
(Slaven, 1980). The British indus-
try was cushioned by rising trade, 
but beset by poor ship design and 
heavy duties on the necessary tim-
ber imports (Jones, 1957). How-
ever, pressure from shipowners led 
to improvements in British ship 
design and Britain survived as a 
leading player in the world wood 
shipbuilding industry, albeit as a 
relatively high cost producer given 
that British ships were about 25 per 
cent more expensive than their 
American counterparts (Jones, 
1957; Slaven, 1980). From the 
1850s onwards, there was a techno-
logical revolution in shipbuilding 
as iron began to replace wood in 
the construction of the hulls of 
ships (Clarke, 1986). The current 
paper examines the role of account-
ing information in shipbuilders’ 
decisions to replace wood by iron 
as the primary material of hull con-
struction and thus bring about tech-
nological and organisational trans-
formations of the industry. 
The context 
 Essentially, the demand for ships 
is the outcome of a complex set of 
relationships between the volume 
and pattern of trade, freight rates, 
the size, speed and age of existing 
fleets and technical advances in 
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construction (Jones, 1957; Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979; Slaven, 
1980). Shipbuilding is a capital 
goods industry par excellence 
(Slaven, 1980), subject to violent 
swings in the demand for its prod-
ucts, and, given this, the prospect 
of bankruptcy always loomed large 
for the shipbuilder during the nine-
teenth century (Todd, 1985). By 
the mid-1850s, British shipbuilders 
had developed a routine process for 
the building of iron ships (Harley, 
1973) and by the 1860s had capital-
ised on their cheap natural re-
sources and pool of skilled engi-
neers to such an extent that Great 
Britain was not only the world’s 
leading shipbuilder “but for some 
time practically monopolized” 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979, 
p.12) iron shipbuilding. In 1862, 
Britain’s iron shipbuilding equaled 
its wooden tonnage for the first 
time and then moved inexorably 
ahead (Clarke, 1986, p.1). Never-
theless, within Britain there were 
regional variations in the rate of 
adoption of the new material and 
its technology. Sunderland, on the 
River Wear on the North East 
Coast of England was a centre of 
shipbuilding activity (Clarke, 1981; 
(Continued from page 1) 
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Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and 
by the 1850s claimed to be the 
greatest shipbuilding town in the 
world (Smith and Holden, 1953). 
However, this claim was based on 
the town’s wood shipbuilding in-
dustry. In the 1850s Sunderland 
had between sixty to seventy ship-
yards; the shipyards were generally 
very small-scale, each employing 
about 30 men, industry entry and 
exit costs were minimal, land 
prices were low and labour forces 
flexible (McLean, 1995). At a com-
petitive advantage in terms of 
wood shipbuilding, Sunderland 
lagged behind the national average 
in the rate of changeover to iron 
shipbuilding: in Sunderland, ton-
nage output of iron shipbuilding 
did not overtake that of wood until 
1868, significantly later than the 
national changeover date of 1862 
(Clarke, 1986). Moreover, within 
Sunderland itself there was consid-
erable time variation between firms 
in the adoption of iron shipbuilding 
(Table 1). 
 The current research analyses 
the roles of personality, business 
environment and accounting infor-
mation in order to explain this 
variation, focusing on two particu-
lar firms, Laing and Doxford, these 
firms being selected for research on 
(Continued on page 4) 
Table 1 
Iron shipbuilding output (tons) in Sunderland 1853 – 1871, by firm 
 
 Year Laing    Oswald*  Pile Doxford Illiff* Thompson Blumer Watson   Short 
 
1853 479 
1854 577 
1855 939 
1856 nil 
1857 610 
1858 3,083 
1859 2,003 497 
1860 2,573 3,798 
1861 6,153  3,903 2,580 
1862 5,429  4,115 4,752 
1863 6,307  6,081 5,093 
1864 6,525 7,974 5,430 2,191 
1865 7,681  7,171 4,708 2,212 
1866 5,084  6,477 1,533 3,198 965 
1867 2,569  3,126 4,853 1,823 1,677 
1868 8,097  9,622 7,296 4,071 5,240 1,112 
1869 7,058  18,983 8,146 2,122 4,478 1,073 1,790 912 
1870 14,502  12,399 10,177 3,724 5,181 2,296 nil 3,750 
1871 15,246  15,485 12,926 7,214 6,091 4,384 533  6,118    2610 
 
 * Oswald opened a purpose-built iron shipyard; he was a nephew of James Laing 
and had started his career in wood shipbuilding; Illiff’s was a purpose-built iron 
shipyard; all other shipyards were converted from wood to iron shipbuilding.  
Adapted from Clarke, 1986, p. 69 
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the basis of the availability of ar-
chive material (Note 1). The re-
mainder of this paper is organised 
into five sections: first, wood and 
iron shipbuilding are compared; 
second, an analysis is made of the 
development of the Laing and Dox-
ford shipyards; third, there is a con-
sideration of the role of accounting 
information for decision‑making in 
shipbuilding; fourth, there is a dis-
cussion of the material presented in 
the paper; and, fifth, conclusions 
are drawn. 
Wood and iron ships compared 
 Between c.1850 – c.1875, wood 
ships could generally match iron 
ships in terms of size, quality, 
speed and technical specification. 
However “in Britain by the end of 
the 1850s it is probable that iron 
ships could generally be built more 
cheaply than wooden vessels” 
(Clarke, 1986, p.47), mainly be-
cause British iron was a cheaper 
raw material than imported wood. 
In 1861, the Sunderland Herald 
noted that “iron vessels, with a full 
East India outfit, can be purchased 
at prices varying from £15 to 
£l5.15s.0d per ton; while a wooden 
vessel of the same class could not 
at present be laid down in any of 
the (Sunderland) yards . . . at the 
same figure” (ibid, p.49). Although 
relative raw material costs did vary 
from time to time, it is clear that 
the cost advantage lay with iron 
shipbuilding which also benefited 
from increasing mechanisation and 
improving labour productivity, 
given that metal‑workers were paid 
on piece‑work while wood-work-
ers were paid on time‑rates. These 
cost advantages made iron rather 
than wood ships increasingly at-
tractive to shipowners and iron 
shipyards were developed to meet 
the changing demand (Clarke, 
1966, 1981, 1986, 1988). The ap-
plication of new materials and 
technology changed much in the 
shipbuilding industry; whereas 
shipwrights and other wood-
workers had naturally dominated 
the wood shipbuilding industry, 
“overwhelmingly, in Britain, the 
men who built the first iron ships 
were from a mechanical engineer-
ing background” (Clarke, 1986, 
p.47). However, in Sunderland vir-
tually all of the men who set up the 
new iron shipbuilding yards during 
the current research period were 
from a background in wood ship-
building (Table 1). The develop-
ment of the Laing and Doxford 
shipyards, the subjects of the cur-
rent research, are examined in more 
detail in the next section. 
The Laing and Doxford  
shipyards 
 In 1792, Philip Laing abandoned 
the profession of medicine to be-
come a partner in his brother’s 
business and took over sole control 
in 1818. Philip’s son James was 
born in 1823, became head of the 
firm in 1843 and presided over it 
until his death in 1901, always em-
ploying specialists to run the day-
to-day operations of the shipyard. 
(Continued from page 3) 
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From its beginnings Laing was a 
multi-activity business, involved in 
trading, shipowning and shipbuild-
ing. Laing’s firm was innovative 
and took out several shipbuilding 
patents (Clarke, 1981; Jeremy, 
1984-86; Smith and Holden, 1953). 
The Laing shipyard was to the fore 
in Sunderland’s adoption of iron 
shipbuilding. Apart from the iso-
lated exception of another yard that 
launched the town’s first iron ship, 
of a mere 72 tons, Laing’s shipyard 
was well ahead of Sunderland’s 
other shipbuilders in the adoption 
of the new material and technology 
of shipbuilding (Table 1): by 1858 
four of its five ships built were 
made of iron and, although iron 
tonnage fell to only half of total 
output in the following year, the 
firm was established as an iron 
shipbuilder (Clarke, 1986). Al-
though the archives of the firm and 
of the Wear Shipbuilders’ Associa-
tion reveal no direct discussion of 
the changeover from wood to iron, 
the Association’s minutes do reveal 
that in 1859 James Laing led a 
campaign against the “oppressive 
and unjust” duties imposed on tim-
b e r  ( T W A S / E M / W S / 1 / l , 
pp.117‑127), indicating the ongo-
ing importance of that raw mate-
rial. 
The available sources present 
rather differing views regarding the 
background of the Doxford family. 
The introduction to the Doxford 
archive (TWAS 1811) states, 
William Doxford senior had 
a small wood shipyard . . 
which he began in 1840. He 
and his partner were declared 
bankrupt the following year, 
and he returned to working 
as a craftsman for another 
firm. The partnership was re-
established in 1845 and con-
tinued until 1851, when once 
again William senior re-
turned to working partly as a 
shipwright and partly as a 
timber merchant. 
 However, Clarke (1986, p.72) 
states that “the family yard had 
almost twenty years of continuous 
existence before… it began 
(building). . . iron vessels in 1864”. 
Furthermore, the Doxford account-
ing archive (TWAS 1811/12/4) 
indicates that William and J. Dox-
ford were in partnership as timber 
merchants as early as 1833 and 
later moved into shipbuilding. De-
spite the differing views presented 
by these sources, they do all con-
firm that the background of Wil-
liam Doxford was in wood rather 
than in metals engineering or gen-
eral trading business. William's 
son, William Theodore, 1841 – 
1916, was probably responsible in 
1864 for starting the family ship-
yard’s changeover from wood to 
iron shipbuilding (Clarke, 1986). 
Accounting information for  
decision-making 
 An analysis (McLean, 1995) of 
the nineteenth century Laing and 
Doxford accounting records indi-
cates that each firm operated a mer-
(Continued on page 6) 
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cantile double-entry accounting 
system adapted to include a form of 
contract accounting for shipbuild-
ing activities, thus enabling the 
calculation of cost and profit or 
loss on each ship constructed. 
However, there were differences 
between the accounting systems. 
Laing included data which Doxford 
did not: Laing’s ship accounts rou-
tinely included a note of ship ton-
nage, which would have facilitated 
a calculation per ton of selling 
price, cost and profit or loss, al-
though such calculations are not 
extant. Neverthless, tonnage data 
was, of course, available in Dox-
ford outside of the accounting sys-
tem and it would have been 
straightforward to make the rele-
vant calculations, although none 
are extant. A further difference be-
tween the systems lay in ap-
proaches to periodicity. Whereas 
Doxford’s system was based 
around the half-yearly calculation 
of profit for the firm, Laing’s sys-
tem was not. Unlike Doxford, 
Laing was also a trading and shi-
powning firm and when 
 Laing built and operated a 
ship as owners, that ship’s 
account reflected its building 
cost, voyage profits and, ulti-
mately, the selling price ob-
tained on the eventual sale of 
the ship and the final overall 
profit made over its entire 
life cycle with the firm . . . 
Profit measurement was not 
periodic, but was based on 
ventures and on the ship as a 
focus of economic activity 
(ibid, p.124). 
 It is conceivable that, by focus-
ing on profit over the life-cycle of 
the ship rather than the calculation 
of half-yearly company profit, the 
Laing accounting system acted as a 
form of social technology enabling 
the development of a long-term 
view of the business in general and 
the changeover from wood to iron 
in particular. Nevertheless it is ap-
parent from the 1861 Sunderland 
Herald quoted above that the re-
spective costs and profits per ton of 
wood and iron were common 
knowledge and that the relatively 
small and tight-knit community of 
Sunderland shipbuilders would 
have been well aware of them. 
Discussion 
 Laing began iron shipbuilding in 
1853, significantly earlier than 
Doxford’s entry into the industry in 
1864. Although Laing’s accounting 
system provided a longer term per-
spective than did Doxford’s it is 
unlikely that this explains the dif-
ference in entry dates. Both ac-
counting systems enabled the cal-
culation of costs and profits per ton 
for each ship built and this infor-
mation could be viewed in the con-
text of comparative cost and profit 
data for wood and iron ships which 
were freely available in the market 
place. Thus it is improbable that 
differences in information avail-
ability can explain the difference in 
timing of entry into iron shipbuild-
(Continued from page 5) 
6
The Accounting Historians Notebook, Vol. 29 [2006], No. 2, Art. 1
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_notebook/vol29/iss2/1
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006                                                                                7 
ing, and answers must be sought 
elsewhere. 
 A new iron shipyard needed to 
be financed of course, but the 
available evidence suggests that 
this in itself need not have pre-
vented Doxford from making the 
changeover earlier than it did. By 
the 1850s, Doxford was a well-
established business, making prof-
its of £1,872 in the 6 months to 30 
December 1854, for example, 
(McLean, 1995) and other Sunder-
land shipbuilders such as Oswald 
and Pile were able to finance iron 
yards earlier from no more favour-
able circumstances (Clarke, 1986). 
It is improbable, therefore, that 
lack of finance explains Doxford’s 
later entry into iron shipbuilding. 
 Insights into the problem of de-
layed entry into iron shipbuilding 
are provided by Harley (1973) and 
Clarke (1986). In the context of the 
North American shipbuilding in-
dustry, Harley contends that de-
layed entry into iron shipbuilding 
was not due to prejudice, ignorance 
and inertia, but due to factors such 
as the immobility of labour. How-
ever such labour problems did not 
arise in Sunderland where ship-
builders were able to draw on 
North East England’s pool of 
skilled metal-workers as Laing in 
fact did do. However Harley also 
notes shipbuilders’ willingness to 
accept lower but adequate returns 
in order to persist with wood ship-
building. Similarly Clarke (1986, 
p.72) has argued that Sunderland’s 
wood shipbuilders “continued to 
find enough customers and accom-
modating credit from timber mer-
chants to continue in their old 
ways”, and, moreover, continued to 
benefit from the repair work 
needed by existing wood fleets. 
 Nevertheless, in considering de-
layed entry into iron shipbuilding it 
is not sufficient simply to examine 
the technical and structural factors 
affecting the decision-making proc-
ess. As Parker (1981, p.131) has 
remarked “a history of accounting . 
. . without some knowledge of the 
actors – those for whom as well as 
those by whom the records were 
kept – must be rather anaemic and 
thin”. The “actors” relevant to the 
current research are James Laing, 
William Doxford and William 
Theodore Doxford. In 1853 when 
James Laing took his business into 
iron shipbuilding he was 30 years 
old, a successful innovator, the 
head of a firm that had been in con-
tinuous existence for over 60 years 
and a businessman rather than a 
wood-working shipwright and 
shipbuilder. In comparison, in 
1853, William Doxford was 41 
years old, with 20 years of experi-
ence of basing his working life 
around wood, as a timber mer-
chant, a working shipwright and a 
shipbuilder and, possibly, as a 
bankrupt. The Doxford shipbuild-
ing moved into iron shipbuilding 
only in 1864, probably under the 
direction of William’s son, the 23 
years old William Theodore Dox-
ford (Clarke, 1986). 
(Continued on page 8) 
7
McLean: Accounting and technological change: the changeover from wood to iron shipbuilding in Sunderland, c. 1850- c. 1875
Published by eGrove, 2006
8                                                                                 The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006 
 Conclusions 
 In the context of freely available 
market information, both the Laing 
and Doxford accounting systems 
provided clear data on the costs and 
profitability of shipbuilding. Al-
though there were differences in 
the systems, particularly in terms of 
reporting time-frames, it is unlikely 
that these are significant in explain-
ing the different entry dates into 
iron shipbuilding. Working experi-
ence and skills, age, personality 
and business outlook are probable 
causal factors in James Laing’s 
early entry into iron shipbuilding, 
William Doxford’s commitment to 
wood shipbuilding and William 
Theodore Doxford’s success in 
making the changeover. 
Note 1: All of the archives drawn 
upon for this research are held by 
the Tyne Wear Archive Service 
(TWAS), Blandford Street, New-
castle Upon Tyne, Great Britain. 
References 
Clarke, J.F. (1966), Labour Rela-
tionships in Engineering and 
Shipbuilding on the North East 
Coast in the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Century, University 
of Newcastle Upon Tyne: unpub-
lished MA thesis. 
Clarke, J.F. (1981), “Shipbuilding 
on the River Wear, 1780 – 
1870”, in R.W. Sturgess (ed.), 
The Great Age of Industry in the 
North East, Durham: Durham 
County Local History Society. 
Clarke, J.F. (1986), The Change-
over from Wood to Iron Ship-
building, Newcastle: Newcastle 
Upon Tyne Polytechnic. 
Clarke, J.F. (1988), “Shipbuilding, 
1780 ‑1914”, in G.E.Milburn 
and S.T. Miller (eds) in Sunder-
land – River, Town and People, 
Sunderland: Sunderland Borough 
Council. 
Harley, C.K. (1973), “On the Per-
sistence of Old Techniques: The 
Case of North American Wooden 
Shipbuilding”, Journal of Eco-
nomic History, 33, pp. 372-398. 
Jones, L. (1957) Shipbuilding in 
Britain, Mainly between the Two 
World Wars, Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press. 
McLean, T. (1995), “Contract ac-
counting and costing in the Sun-
derland shipbuilding Industry, 
1818 – 1917”, Accounting, Busi-
ness and Financial History, Vol. 
5, No. 1, pp. 109 – 145. 
Pollard, S. and P. Robert-
son,(1979),The British Shipbuild-
ing Industry, 1870 – 1914, Lon-
don: Harvard University Press. 
Slaven, B. (1980), J.W. Smith, and 
T.S. Holden (1953), Where Ships 
Are Born, Sunderland 1346 - 
1946, Sunderland: Thomas Reed. 
Todd, D. (1985), The World Ship-
building Industry, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
TWAS, Tyne Wear Archive Ser-
vice, Blandford Street, Newcastle 
Upon Tyne, Great Britain. 
Unger, R.W. (1978), Dutch Ship-
building Before 1800, Assen, 
Netherlands: Van Gorum. 
(Continued from page 7) 
8
The Accounting Historians Notebook, Vol. 29 [2006], No. 2, Art. 1
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_notebook/vol29/iss2/1
